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MASSACHUSETFS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
1. The Theme: Organized Disaggregation
THE relation between capital formation and economic growth is
a large part of the total problem of economic growth. Taking the
rate of change of output to be a function of the rate of change in
the size and quality of the working force and of the capital stock,
this conference is analyzing the total growth problem, leaving the
working force aside. And even then, in Levy's paper and elsewhere,
the relation of capital formation to the size of the population—and
even to the size and quality of the working force (Grossman) —has
come into the discussion. We have taken on, then, a considerable
and ramified set of issues.
Further, these issues are distinctly revolutionary. There appears
•to be complete unanimity—reflected in the substance of the papers
as well as in the program of the conference—that the relation of
capital formation to growth cannot be treated by the conventional
tools of short-run economics. We appear to agree that, by definition,
we are dealing with problems of rates of change over time rather
than with short-period equilibrium; and that continuing changes in
capacity, technique, and taste—normally-treatedexogenously in
modern economic theory, or in once-over change exercises—must
somehow be introduced endogenously. More than that, we all appear
to believe that an understanding of the relation between capital
formation and economic growth demands that somehow, at some
stage of the analysis, we bring to bear on the relevant economic
variables social, political, and cultural forces which affect their net
movement.
Because we agree about the range of the relevant variables, we
come at this problem from many directions—in academic terms, from
many different disciplines. The contributions here range from Lowe's
austere theory through a spectrum of generalized but limited in-
sights, based on empirical situations and data, back to that develop-
ing branch of social theory represented by Levy's contribution. At
the present, early stage of concerted thought on growth, our con-
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tributions necessarily must be partial. All the papers presented at
the conference discuss one or another of the sub-determinants of the
relation between capital formation and economic growth, rather
than the relation itself, in its full complexity and grandeur.
We are, then, trying to make diverse bodies of data and diverse
social science techniques effectively converge. On this view of our
common problem, the present group of papers represent a major
stride forward. There is an emergent area of common understand-
ing—sometimes implicit, often explicit—as to how the various pieces
of the puzzle fit together. There is more here than mere courteous
acknowledgment that each has a right to his private line of approach.
Not only is there agreement that we each have hold of a piece of the
elephant; a consensus on the elephant's shape is also beginning to
emerge. It is evident that we have been reading each other's articles
and books. Before this conference I was inclined to the view that
little actual work of synthesis had been done, beyond laudable pro-
grammatic statements. The noneconomic variables had not been sat-
isfactorily related to the economics of the growth process. I think
we can agree that this conference has made important progress to-
ward this kind of synthesis. Although none of the studies presented
for this conference pretend to meet the workmanlike vision of orderly
growth analysis that Lowe holds up as a goal, a number of them
go an important distance toward linking coherently the disparate
variables that determine the relation of capital formation to eco-
nomic growth.
There is, for example, Aubrey's systematic consideration of the
manner in which the conventional profit maximization analysis of
capital formation must be modified to fit the context of industrial
enterprise in underdeveloped countries. This exercise goes well be-
yond empirical description. Hoselitz's reflections on British and
French entrepreneurship since 1700 are explicitly linked to the
relative scale of capital formation and over-all growth rates in the
two countries; and Cochran seeks to make American entrepreneurial
history illuminate Kuznets' American growth statistics. These papers
are not merely summaries of odd institutional evidence. Similarly,
Maclaurin's reflections on innovation pose questions of the first order
of importance concerning the productivity of different kinds of
investment and innovations. There are many other indications
throughout these papers that the concerted study of a commonly
understood problem is replacing methodological exhortation.
Under these circumstances the evident function of a commenta-
tor is to heighten a little our awareness of the links among the
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various approaches to growth analysis and to open up for general
discussion the question of useful next steps. I shall simplify my
task by elaborating a single arbitrary theme: the importance of
organized disaggregation in growth analysis. This theme is relevant
whether we are primarily concerned with making formal theoretical
models of the growth process (Lowe); organizing rigorous statistical
measures of historical patterns (Kuznets); examining functionally
such sub-determinants of growth as the flows of loanable funds
(Goldsmith) or the flows of science, invention, and innovation
(Usher, Maclaurin, Cochran, and Hoselitz); defining current growth
problems in particular settings (Aubrey, Grossman, and Holzman);
or examining systematically the noneconomic motives and institu-
tions which help determine the economic outcome (Levy). In all
these tasks we must try increasingly to link the aggregate variables
to organized knowledge of the components and sectors of which
they are composed.
2. Disaggregation andGrowthModels
It follows from this central theme that I have found the argument
of Lowe generally sympathetic and suggestive. Although couched in
the language of growth, the theoretical exercises of Harrod, Domar,
Hicks, and Goodwin (and others) have not been concerned with
the variables determining differences in the rate and structure of
growth. Their primary purpose has been to demonstrate that the
growth process is likely to proceed in unstable cycles of unemploy-
ment. By introducing a degree of disaggregatibn and by setting in
motion some of the variables usually frozen in growth models,
Lowe has linked income analysis to the problems of changing eco-
nomic structure. He opens for formal examination the relations be-
tween over-all growth and the changing levels of sectorial capacity
within the economy; and he makes clear the significance of the
timing and sequence of structural change for cyclical and other
disturbances.
The principal exercises on which Lowe concentrates are a once-
over change in labor supply, the relation between changes in the
consumption function and the structure of the economy, and the
problem of factor displacement in technical change. These are all
important cases. They permit Lowe to bring within the scope of
rigorous formal treatment those problems in economic growth which
are generally dealt with ad hoc, if at all.
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At the end of his paper Lowe speculates on two major issues
which belong high on the agenda for further analysis:first, the
question of the capital-output ratio;' second, the manner in which
formal theoretical analysis can be related systematically to psycho-
logical,sociological,political,legal, and other variables which
shape the growth process in real life.
I am convinced that we require far more extensive empirical
analysis of the relation between changes in the capital stock and
its total consequences for the level of output than we now have
available.2 An improved understanding of the past and of relative
growth rates among contemporary industrialized societies hinges
on a clarification of the determinants of the productivity of dif-
ferent kinds of investment at different stages in the growth sequence.
Our ability to prescribe appropriate patterns of investment for un-
derdeveloped areas will also depend on the refinement of such
knowledge.
We will have to go behind such global estimates of the capital-
output ratio as those used by Lowe in his discussion of Singer's
estimates (pages 632-633). The capital-output ratio as currently
used is, after all, a kind of index number. Its level (and especially
the interpretation of changes in it, or of differences in its level as
among different areas) can only be understood in the light of an
understanding of its components. Those who are now attempting
to plan the pattern of investment outlays in underdeveloped coun-
tries make more or less explicit assumptions not merely about the
total capital-output ratio but also about the short- and long-period
effects on the level of output of investment in particular sectors;
and they take into account not only sectoral differences but the
cost of noncapital inputs as well. I would suggest that there is a
weaker case for using over-all capital-output ratios than there ever
was for focusing attention on over-all price or production indexes.
The lines of thought suggested in Lowe's paper which link sav-
ings-consumption balances to the structural problems of growth
deserve to be pursued. But without losing touch with the aggregates
which make up his (or other possible) growth equations, we might
1Theimperfections and ambiguities of the capital-output ratio as a general
measure of capital productivity are being examined by others and will not be
discussed in the present paper.
2Theauthor developed this theme at length in his unpublished paper pre-
sented before the 1953 conference of the International Economic Association
at Santa Marguerita, Italy, "Trends in the Allocation of Resources in Secular
Growth."
638SOME GENERAL REFLECTIONS
usefully disaggregate our analyses beyond the level of his theoretical
structure.
Over any particular period, in any national or regional economy
which is growing, the growth process is carried forward by a rela-
tively few major sectors. These may incorporate new technical pos-
sibilities, like the early British textile factories; they may reflect
fundamental political decisions of the society, like the post-1945
boom in the annament industries of the world; they may reflect a
newly indulged taste, as real income rises, like American suburban
housing. These leading sectors set in motion behind them a whole
train of secondary effective demands as, for example, suburbaniza-
tion elevates the demand for automobiles and new commercial con-
struction. Historically these leading sectors create external econo-
mies which facilitated the development of new leading sectors as
the momentum of the old ones decreased. Thus, for example, the
textile engineering firms moved into locomotives; and a steel indus-
try built on rails turned easily to machine tools. lEn the end, the
structural categories suggested by old-fashioned capital theory or
by the categories of modern income analysis will have to be pierced
to the point where the structural characteristics of growth can be
examined with an intimacy and particularity Lowe does not attempt.
3. Disaggregation andStatisticalAnalyses of Growth
My observations on Kuznets' statistical essay relate closely to
those I have made on Lowe's theoretical paper. Kuznets' work has
produced an orderly body of data on the relation of capital formation
to national product. In particular, he makes possible a quantitative
assessment of the historical role of international capital movements
in modern economic development.
Those who contribute statistical clarity to the murky field of eco-
nomic growth put us especially in their debt. They have a right
as well as a need to work within narrow analytic boundaries. The
particular limitation that Kuznets accepts at the present stage is
to postpone the measurement of the relation of capital formation
to the rate of growth (as opposed to the relation between capital
formation and the level of national income). I have no doubt that
he has on hand, or ready at hand, systematic information on this
central quantitative relationship. In fact, in his equally valuable
statistical study, Goldsmith gives us (page 115) a table of growth
rates which might be directly linked to Kuznets' figures on the
proportion of national income invested at various stages in the
growth process of Western nations. A portion of Kuznets' subject
639ROSTOW
is, of course, narrower and more sharply focused than the over-all
relation between capital formation and growth rates. He is con-
cerned to measure roughly the quantitative importance of interna-
tional capital flows, and to speculate on the meaning of the pro-
portions that emerge.
When, as will surely happen, other analysts exploit this statistical
breakthrough, they will have to proceed in terms not merely of
the over-all scale (or proportion) of capital flows but of the par-
ticular directions in which they were used by the capital-importing
nation. The story of international capital investment is tied up with
particular stages in the growth of particular economies, and even
with the situation in particular sectors. The capital exports from
Britain in the 1830's, for example, can be understood substantially
in terms of the world cotton market and the extension of cotton
lands in the American South which proceeded in response to cur-
rent and prospective cotton prices. At later stages in Anglo-American
history, substantial British flows are intimately asscciated with
wheat and railroads. In the late 1880's the major flows from London
result from the emergence of the Argentine into some kind of po-
litical stability, which permitted it to bid for resources to finance
basic port, railroad, and other facilities. To understand and to in-
terpret fully the aggregate data Kuznets has supplied, we will have
to study the components and examine the recognizable process
which led to the ebb and flow of international funds.
I would suggest that Kuznets' generalization that "the volume of
international capital exports was restricted primarily because the
supplI of savings available was limited" (page 43) may be modi-
fied when the evidence has been examined in the light of his
calculations. Although the United States of the 1840's, for example,
had immense if not unlimited long-run capital-absorptive capacity,
it also bad just passed through a land and public works boom in
which the British investor lost a substantial part of his shirt. Ameri-
cans could appear in the City of London in 1840 only at some per-
sonal risk; and the British at this stage turned their flows of invest-
ment inward to the development of their own railways. The limita-
tion on internationalcapital flowsresulted from achanging
balance between the attractiveness and the believed degree of risk
in various rapidly developing parts of the world, and the attractive-
ness of home investment. Moreover, the expected (private) rate of
return over cost could be high in domestic sectors where demand
pressed against capacity, even when no dramatic technological in-
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novations were being introduced or rich new resources were being
developed. The determinants of maximum short-run private profit-
ability are not identical with the determinants of a maximum rate
of growth;
In the end, of course, the limitation was, as Kuznets says, one
of capital supply; for there were usually, in the nineteenth century,
claimants on the international capital markets who were turned
away. But international capital flows were the result of a somewhat
more complex and shifting balance of market incentives and re-
straints than Kuznets' conclusion might indicate.
Speculating, for a moment, on what would happen if Kuznets'
calculations were combined with data (for comparable periods) of
the kind presented in Coldsmith's growth rate table, I suspect that
we would find significant differences between the proportion of na-
tional income invested and the rate of growth, even among advanced
countries, as well as differences within countries at different stages
in their economic history. Kuznets' pioneering study (1930) on
secular movements in production has demonstrated the universality
•of deceleration in particular sectors of the economy. There seems
little doubt that among the forces which determine deceleration
in particular industries is a kind of diminishing returns .to particular
forms of innovation. The capital-output ratio in the British cotton
industry in 1790 was almost certainly quite different from that in
1840, 1890, or 1930. The relative long-term stability of the over-
all capital-output ratio in certain advanced countries may well
emerge as the result of the balancing out pf differing rates among
different industries at the same period of time, some young, others
old. It will only be when we have quantitative knowledge of the
capital-output ratio in different sectors of an economy, at different
historical stages, that we will be able to understand differing over-
all levels, or even relative long-term stability in the over-all level.
Turning now to the other contribution of solid statistical substance
(that of Goldsmith) I should like to make one comment in passing,
strictly as an economic historian. My field has been bedeviled by a
tendency to lapse into institutional description leading virtually no-
where from the economist's point of view. There is hardly a text-
book in economic history which does not have its chapters or
section devoted to the evolution of financial institutions. Occasion-
ally thrown into these• sections are brief and inadequate stories of
See, for example, Brinley Thomas's discussion "Migration and the Rhythm
of Economic Growth," The Manchester School, September 1951.
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financial crises, odd price data, and random reflections on the
business cycle. So far as I know, Goldsmith's is the first effort to
treat quantitatively the accumulated mass of data on the historical
pattern of financial institutions in various countries, and the first
effort to link such institutional analysis with the problem of capital
supply and economic growth. Aside from its contribution to growth
analysis, Goldsmith's paper is an important essay in economic
history.
Like those of Kuznets and any others who deal with growth in
orderly quantitative terms, Goldsmith's conclusions are limited by
the nature and character of his data and the limited distance that
he can go quantitatively in coping with the growth process as a
whole. Nevertheless, his fundamentally agnostic interim conclusion
(pages 158-160) conforms closely to the instinctive answer of an eco-
nomic historian: namely, that men have made their economic pur-
poses effective in an enormous variety of ways, and one would not
expect a simple correspondence between particular kinds of in-
stitutions for mobilizing savings and the rate of growth. Modern
economic history suggests a certain suspicion of firm correlations
between particular institutional patterns (political, cultural, and
social, as well as economic) and rates of growth.
One further comment on Goldsmith's paper. I am reasonably
doubtful that, even after we have pursued the analysis of growth
for several further decades, we will emerge with what a modern
economic theorist would regard as a theory of economic growth.
There are too many variables to be disciplined into forms where the
number of equations are equal to the number of unknowns; and, even
more important, the kinds of variables we would all wish to see intro-
duced from the side of politics, social structure, and culture do not
lend themselves to a Newtonian kind of theory, elaborated from clear,
minimum arbitrary hypotheses. However, the technique of com-
parative morphology, of which Goldsmith's paper is a distinguished
example, and, for which there are important precedents in certain
of the natural sciences, may prove highly appropriate to our problem.
4. Invention, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship
I turn now to four related papers presented to the conference by
Usher, Maclaurin, Cochran, and Hoselitz. As Lowe says (page 622),
"The theory of technical change isstill a stepchild of economic
analysis." In one part of our minds and in the ritualistic listing of
the determinants of the level of investment and of the rate of growth,
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the state of technology has always had its formal place in eco-
nomics. Moreover, Schumpeter and others have produced important
and stimulating generalized observations on the process which lies
between fundamental science and the productivity of investment
inputs. What is lacking is a systematic view of invention, innova-
tion, and the diffusion of innovation which might be effectively
woven into a total analysis of the scale and productivity of capital
investment.
If the Keynesian curve of marginal efficiency of capital has any
operative meaning, it has always contained implicit assumptions
about these variables. The level of effective demand for investment,
in terms of expected rates of return over cost, has always depended
not merely on the state of technology in some generalized sense but
on the extent to which entrepreneurs were prepared to apply
known innovations.4 Behind the level of capital demand, even in
the short-run Keynesian sense, lie processes analyzed by Usher and
Maclaurin and the qualities of entrepreneurship treated by Coch-
ran and Hoselitz.
Usher's paper presents,in heightened form, the thesis with
which his name has long been associated: namely, that invention is
to be regarded as a continuous flow, representing the product of
the more or less purposeful investment of a society in that peculiar
creative sector, applied science. Against the background of evidence
that Usher has amassed over the years, it is no longer tenable to
treat invention and technical innovation as an exogenous force
striking from time to time against the productive system through
the medium of some Hegelian hero. Despite its peculiarities, in-
vention is a normal part of the investment process, directed, like
other forms of investment, toward believed areas of high rate of
return over cost. Although Usher himself does not discuss this form
of investment—the investment of resources in the generation of
productive technical possibilities—in terms of a general theory of
capital formation, it is time for economists to weave this variable
into their analyses in a quite formal way. This demands that they
include, among the sectors of the economy, that sector representing
the current capacity to produce new technical improvements, and
that they examine the order of magnitude of the investment input
and its productivity in different societies at different periods.
For an effort to link growth analysis to the Keynesian analysis of the de-
terniination of the level of investment see the present author's The Process of
Economic Growth, Norton, 1952, pp. 65-69.
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Maclaurin's further observations on this theme indicate that
to treat innovation in any kind of strict relation to capital fonna-
tion, we must engage, again, in an important degree of disaggrega-
tion. Maclaurin has built up, from his examination of the innovation
process in particular industries, persuasive evidence both for the
changing productivity of innovation at various stages of an in-
dustry's history and for differences in the productivity of innovation
as among sectors of the economy. His evidence reinforces the view
that the capital-output ratio must be examined in terms of sectors of
an economy. Maclaurin dramatizes the argument by exploring the
prospects for investment productivity in advanced countries, where
an increasing proportion of total output, and especially of new in-
vestment, goes into service and other nonmanufacturing industries.
Here the natural sciences may not help the growth process as much
as in periods when the heavy and engineering industries lead the
way. Maclaurin's general argument comes to rest on prospects for
the housing industry, which, apparently throughout the world, has
resisted innovation with remarkable tenacity. He suggests that the
maintenance of high investment productivity in advanced countries
may depend on the generation and acceptance of housing innova-
tions, to which the social scientist as well as the engineer will have
to contribute.
Taken together, Usher's and Maclaurin's arguments add up to a
strong case for including the scale and productivity of the flow of
innovations as an important determinant of the capital-output ratio,
and for alertness to the possibility of variations in that ratio arising
from the historical stage of the innovation process in partici,ilar
industries and sectors of the economy.
The arguments of Cochran and Hoselitz take us a step further.
They are concerned to indicate, in the context of three countries
(the United States, Britain, and France) the conditions under
which men have been willing to undertake the risks of capital for-
mation. While it is convenient and important in many analyses to
distinguish the kind of risk-taking which goes into the lending of
money from that associated with its borrowing or with the willing-
ness to initiate or diffuse innovations, these various determinants of
the scale and productivity of investment outlays tend to merge under
certain institutional circumstances. The papers by Cochran and
Hoselitz relate to both sides of the market for loanable funds. The
early stages of British and American capitalism saw these separable
elements in capital formation focused in the same institutions or
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even in the same persons. This identity remains partially with us
in the current role of retained earnings in corporate finance, as
well as in the role of governments as both entrepreneur and sup-
plier of loanable funds on a substantial scale.
It is an important virtue of Cochran's essay that this issue and
other analytical problems of general interest come clearly through
his effort to take stock of the present position of American entre-
preneurial study. His paper is heartening for those who have watched
the development of the sprawling field of entrepreneurial research.
It seemed for a time that we would be confronted by an endless
series of histories of firms drawn up in implicit analytical terms
derived simply from the firms' own records, without any link to the
main body of thought and research on capital formation and eco-
nomic growth. Although entrepreneurial study received an enormous
impetus from the theoretical insights of Schumpeter, its first phase
took the form of the amassing of empirical data, with little attention
to its generalization or to its relationship with other bodies of
thought. These individual studies varied, of course, in their general
interest and quality; but they were characterized by a failure to re-
late the role of the entrepreneur to the other factors determining
the firm's capital formation. The firm's history was often inadequately
linked to the region of which it was a part and to more general
aspects of the nation's economic history, as reflected in quantitative
and other evidence of growth and fluctuations.
It is clear that Cochran is seeking to make this body of historical
data illuminate the statistics, such as they are, and help explain
changes in rates of capital formation in the United States. The links
that are made by Cochran (for example, page 341 and especially
pages 363-364) are certainly not as fine as the statisticians would
desire or as Cochran would like to make. Nevertheless, it is evident
that we have turned a corner in the field of entrepreneurial history.
Cochran's paper is an indication that this field has begun to justify
itself as a central part of the study of capital formation at its most
generalized level.
Much the same kind of intellectual progress is represented in
Hoselitz's paper on the comparative economic performances of
Britain and France as they relate to the character and quality
of entrepreneurship since 1700. Again we find a purposeful effort
to link the conclusions on entrepreneurship to the over-all rates and
patterns of growth. Although the number of entrepreneurial studies
available on France is less than on the United States, the influence
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of the unique social, political, and cultural structure of France as it
operated through itsentrepreneurs on the growth process has
attracted some of the ablest men working in economic history.
Hoselitz's extremely interesting effort at synthesis has excellent
foundations.
These two essays in entrepreneurship illustrate once again the
central theme of this commentary. When we deal with entrepre-
neurs, we are dealing with men who made decisions within individ-
ual firms and allocated the resources of individual firms. Our
evidence is, by definition, micro- rather than macroevidence. We
are in a Marshallian world of partial equilibrium when we examine
the records of a firm, even a highly monopolistic firm. We are ex-
amining the supply of loanable funds, demand expectations, and
the risks of innovation in the precise but limited settings of par-
ticular capital formation decisions. Our generalizations must be
built up, therefore, from knowledge of finns to sectors of the econ-
omy; and, ultimately, as Cochran and Hoselitz have tried to do,
these intermediate generalizations must be linked with over-all evi-
dence on the rates and patterns of national growth. There is, how-
ever, an enormous jump from the microdata of the historian to the
over-all, long-period growth rates to which Cochran and Hoselitz
relate their entrepreneurial findings. As a result, their evidence can
at the moment be brought to bear only in the form of broad gen-
eralizations and insights concerning the forces determining high
or low, accelerating or decelerating, rates of growth. If, however,
they had available systematic data on the growth rates of particular
sectors of the economy, their evidence on entrepreneurship in par-
ticular industries at particular periods could be much more fully
used. Qualities of entrepreneurship have always varied widely
among the various sectors of an economy, and the data available to
the expert on entrepreneurial history could illuminate the stories
of sectors much more precisely than they can aggregate national
statistics.
Moreover, in order to explore the meaning of aggregate growth
statistics, we must, as noted earlier, examine them in the light of
the differing growth rates in different sectors of the economy. Since
entrepreneurial qualities are not uniform as among the sectors, we
must bring our knowledge of entrepreneurial history to focus at the
sectorial level. This will not preclude coming back again to the
larger issues which Cochran and Hoselitz approach directly. It
will mean that they will be able to approach these larger issues hay-
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ing moved up within a more systematic structure of analysis and
a more systematic structure of statistical evidence than is now
available to them.
5. The Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Investment
Although Aubrey's paper belongs, in subject matter, with the
growing literature on problems of growth in underdeveloped areas,
intellectually it stands with the essays of Cochran and Hoselitz.
Like them, Aubrey has organized a vast amount of empirical data
at an intermediate level of abstraction, thus rendering our knowl-
edge of the facts more accessible and, especially, more susceptible
of manipulation. Whereas Cochran and Hoselitz seek to make their
data illuminate the relations between entrepreneurial quality and
over-all rates of growth in three major countries, Aubrey's contribu-
tion is of a more general, theoretical nature. He systematically
explains, in terms of a partial equilibrium analytic structure focused
on the determinants of individual investment decisions, the differ-
erences between the profit maximization model which governs our
thought about investment in the Western world and the shape of
the investment problem in underdeveloped areas. He demonstrates
forcibly the manner in which the context of underdeveloped areas
demands a relaxation or change in many of the implicit and explicit
assumptions carried over from knowledge of the capital formation
process in Western capitalist societies.
Within its narrow limits Aubrey's paper presents an orderly
analysis of noneconomic variables. The social, political, cultural, and
technical determinants of economic growth are carefully and pre-
cisely linked to the strictly economic variables which govern in-
dividual investment decisions. In the end we emerge with a
heightened understanding of the clash, from the point of view of
the individual investor, between profit maximization and security,
and of the cross purposes which may develop between the interests
of the individual investor and society as a whole.
Nevertheless, a key problem for growth analysis remains. How
can Aubrey's evidence and analysis be translated into terms which
would bear on the aggregate categories of such theoretical structures
as Lowe's or which would illuminate aggregate data on underde-
veloped areas of the kind Kuznets has mobilized on more advanced
countries? The answer lies, again, I believe, in building up the study
of sectors. At the level of a particular industry we can link the
wealth of partial equilibrium data available to the aggregates and
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seize on the full determinants of the scale .and productivity of in-
vestment. The leap is too great for systematic analysis without the
sectorial substructure; and we are likely to shift from one side of
the moon to the other, as we now tend to do, assisted merely by
intuitive specu1ation.
6. The Soviet Case
The two papers available on the Soviet Union, like many of the
others, help clarify factors which determine the relation between
capital formation and economic growth, without directly assaulting
that key relationship.
The student of growth within a single economy has important
primafacie advantages over the general theorist or the functional
specialist in one or another variable affecting the growth rate. The
examination of a given country makes it vastly easier to bring into
focus the full range of forces, economic and noneconomic, at work
in the growth process. The unity of the, area and the society under
examination directly facilitates the unification of various strands
in the analysis. It is quite natural for }Jolzman, for example, to
weave into his treatment of Soviet inflation (page 261) the peculiaE
Soviet organization of the firm, brilliantly depicted in the various
studies of Berliner. Although Holzman is concerned with a rela-
tively narrow and clear-cut issue of public finance, he moves easily
between his statistical data and the ideological, institutional, and
other forces which determined the outcome for the price level.
Similarly, the analyst of a single national economy finds it easy,
if not unavoidable, to treat the aggregates determining capital
formation and growth in terms of sectors. There is a quality of
intimacy in Grossman's analysis of current trends in Soviet capital
formation. His insights into the meaning and problems of the Fifth
Five-Year Plan, and the aggregate growth rate it incorporates, come
alive for the reason that he is, by definition, examining over-all
objectives in terms of their principal sectorial components. Capital-
intensity ceases to be a remote antiseptic variable in an equation
(pages 182 if.). It is tied in ways that are quantitative in conception
—if not exactly measurable—to the position in Soviet agriculture,
For pioneering examples of the kind of sectorial analysis I have in mind
see Paul C. Clark, "The Telephone Industry: A Study in Private Investment,"
and Anne P. Crosse, "The Technological Structure of the Cotton Textile In-
dustry," in W. W. Leontief and others, Studies in the Structure of the American
Economy, Oxford, 1953.
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housing, and even education, as well as to other sectors of the
economy about which we can amass useful, if partial, evidence.
It is not accidental that some of the most original current work on
capital formation and economic growth has arisen from speculation
on the comparative economic performances of the United States and
the U.S.S.R. We may or may not, over the years, be able to organize
exact statistical evidence on the productivity of different kinds of
investment outlays. But we should certainly be able to develop
propositions, quantitative• in character, which permit us to compare
the growth patterns in different economies, and to isolate the reasons
for differences among them. In his essay on "Capital Formation and
Allocation" this is precisely what Kaplan did; and he concludes:
"Thus, if the data can be believed, and if the analysis has been cor-
rect, the greater rate of increase of industrial output in the USSR
[than in the United.States] has been due, basically, nottodifferences
in the USSR—United States rates of investment, but rather to dif-
ferences in the direction of investment."8
It has been my experience as a historian that neither the business
cycle nor trend periods (in prices, interest rates, etc.) could be
understood as historical phenomena until changing sectorial pat-
terns of investment in the past had been examined. I am reasonably
confident that the same body of data will emerge as central to the
historical understanding of long-term growth rates and their de-
terminants.
7. The Contribution of Sociology
We come, finally, to Levy's study of "Some Social Obstacles to
Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Areas." This is a remarkable
paper in several respects. First, Levy has taken care to clarify the
economic determinants of capital formation before bringing to bear
on them the insights of social theory. He has entered into the econ-
omist's problem, in terms recognizable to the economist. Second,
he has chosen to state his preliminary hypotheses mainly in terms
of a comparative analysis of two societies, those of Japan and China.
In combination these qualities make possible a more detailed linkage
of economic theory and social theory than one usually finds in inter-
disciplinary efforts. There is no quick generalization here, associat-
ing particular social systems with the conditions for rapid growth.
6InSoviet Economic Growth, Abram Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, 1953,
p.80.
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Levy has begun to examine the components of social systems in
relation to components of the economic process.
My sympathy for his approach derives from the agnosticism of
the historian. Men have worked hard and imaginatively in the past
out of a variety of motives. Economic progress has been achieved
by societies as different in structure, institutions, and prevailing
value systems as Britain and Japan, the United States and the
Soviet Union. Neither Marxist theory nor any other general theory
of society now available satisfactorily accounts for the diversities
in pattern which societies have exhibited in general, and in their
economic performance.
In contrasting the response of Japan and that of China to the
challenge of Western industrial and military strength, Levy has
chosen good illustrative material. They differ from the West, and
they differ from one another. He has demonstrated how diverse
the relations can be between the elements in an old culture and the
requirements of industrial capital formation. On the whole, the
inherited structure of Japan, as of the mid-nineteenth century, lent
itself more easily to economic growth than did that of China; but
this net conclusion arises from a complicated set of circumstances,
not susceptible of easy generalization. Moreover (as Levy sug-
gests, page 478), the comparison is incomplete uiiless we embrace
in our inalysis unique historical circumstances—e.g. the chronic mili-
tary pressure on China, which Japan was spared, including the
disastrous effects of the Japanese invasion (from 1981) on the social
and economic structure of the Nationalist China which began to
emerge in the 1920's.
8. Comparative Morphology and a Non-Newtonian
Theory of Growth
If it is true that we are unlikely to find simple associations between
types of social structures (or cultures) and the conditions for eco-
nomic progress, what becomes of the prospects for a general theory
of economic growth? It is, of course, possible that in the fullness
of time we shall develop an accepted general theory of society of
which economics is one facet. Given the nature of the growth prob-
lem, nothing less is implied by the concept of a theory of economic
growth. For the foreseeable future, however, our aim might well
be more modest: to array the patterns of growth known to us in
terms which permit systematic comparison. After all, the number
of societies which have passed through the transition to industrializa-
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tion is limited. It should not be beyond the capacity of the social
sciences to array the quantitative information available on them, in
roughly uniform categories; and to explore the reasons for similarity
and difference of pattern, in the light of the full determinants of
economic performance. From such a grand exercise in comparative
morphology, higher-order generalizations will surely emerge, re-
lating both to the strict economics of growth and to the general
social determinants of econoniic performance.
I believe that some such intermediate goal is implicit in most
of the papers presented to this conference. The method of compari-
son of national patterns is used explicitly by Kuznets, Goldsmith,
Hoselitz, and Levy; on a functional basis, the morphologist's tech-
nique is used by Aubrey, Maclaurin, and Usher; and, as indicated
earlier, the general significance of the Soviet economic performance
is increasingly being examined by means of international comparison.
I have tried in this paper to suggest the importance of sectorial
analysis in furthering our understanding of economic growth. I
believe it important for the refinement of theory; in the collection
and interpretation of statistics; and, especially, as a means of linking
systematically bodies of partial empirical evidence to aggregative
concepts and data. Finally, meaningful international comparisons
of growth patterns and processes require the building up of this
intermediate level of analysis. The degree and kind of disaggrega-
tion appropriate will vary, as indicated in this paper, with the
nature of the problem chosen for analysis and the nature of the
data available.
In concluding I would make a further proposal: we might well
attempt to codify, in a rough way, the measure of our theoretical
agreement. Theory is a way of looking at things. Whether or not
our various particular contributions will be susceptible of aggrega-
tion and cross comparison depends in part on whether we look at
the growth process in similar ways. More technically, the useful-
ness of national growth studies will depend in part on whether or
not we use comparable statistical categories and introduce into
our analyses similar bodies of noneconomic data.
I am aware of the attachment that grows up between a social
scientist and his private vocabulary, and of the dangers that inhere
in the encouragement of abstract discussion in murky fields. Never-
theless, there may be some use in it for us, seeking to understand a
many-sided problem, trying to use, in our own work, the results
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achieved by colleagues whose training, vocabulary, and data are
often unfamiliar.
C 0 M M E N T
WUIL4M J. FELLNER, Yale University
My interpretation of Lowe's position will be based exclusively
on the paper which he has submitted to this conference. On the
other hand, in my interpretation of Rostow's position, I will also
take account of his previous work. It seems to me that the essential
characteristic of Rostow's position is his primary concern with the
beginnings of growth processes in specific sectors of the economy,
and their propagation through interrelations among the many sectors
of our complex systems.
Rostow's and Lowe's analyses may be said to relate to two dif-
ferent aspects of the same problem—the relationship between long-
run and short-run growth requirements. Both Rostow and Lowe
place great emphasis on the necessity of analyzing the structure of
resource specialization in connection with growth conditions.
I believe that the connections as well as the differences between
these two contributions can be made clear by first distinguishing two
types of structural analysis from each other, a long-run variety and
a short-run variety, and by subsequently pointing out that both
authors warn us effectively against relying on the long-run type of
analysis without taking cognizance of certain results that can be
obtained oniy by engaging in so-called short-run theorizing. The
characteristic of short-run theorizing in this sense is that it deals
with specialized resources—with different kinds of equipment rather
than with "capital," and with different sorts of workers rather
than with "labor."
In the aggregative models of recent years a basic condition of
economic growth has been developed in terms of the rate of growth
of output, the marginal capital-output requirement, the ex ante
average propensity to save, and the rate of output itself. The aggre-
gative condition is that the product of the first two of these four
magnitudes should equal the product of the last two. In a con-
tinuously growing economy, this condition would have to be con-
tinuously satisfied. In an economy which shows merely long-run
growth trends, there must be a long-run tendency toward satisfying
this condition; that is to say, the violations of this condition must
not permanently stop the growth process. Such aggregative theo-
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rizing must be supplemented by structural investigation, because
by merely looking at the aggregative condition we cannot arrive
at meaningful propositions as to the circumstances under which
it is likely to be satisfied. Let us now distinguish between a long-
run and a short-run variety of structural analysis, and then turn
to the connecting links.
The long-run type of structural analysis directs attention to pro-
portions between various broad categories of factors of production,
in the unspecialized sense. On this level of analysis the fact that
stands out most is that, in industrial economies, the capital stock
is growing more rapidly than the supply of factors cooperating with
capital. It would be unrealistic to assume that the growth process
could continue against a lasting and substantial pressure of di-
minishing returns to capital. Consequently, we need improvements
(innovations) to offset such a tendency. Furthermore, these im-
provements must have the effect of raising the marginal productivity
schedule of capital, not just that of any factor of production. If
improvements fail to raise the marginal productivity schedule of
capital sufficiently, the growth process will be interrupted, excess
capacity will develop, output will contract, and labor will become
unemployed. While the improvements must be primarily capital-
productivity-raising (or labor-saving), they must not treat the pro-
ductivity schedule of labor too badly, because if they do so, there will
have to be a continuous decrease in the share of labor or a continuous
increase in chronic unemployment. It is difficult to tell what the limits
of tolerance of the system were in early times to a decrease in the
share of labor. Today these limits of tolerance would be small; and
we have reason to believe that, in fact, there has been no long-run
tendency in this direction for many decades. The limits of tolerance
to increasing chronic unemployment are nil, nor has there been
a tendency toward this condition, although for a while the depression
of the 1930's made some economists very pessimistic about this.
To repeat: improvements must raise the productivity schedule
of capital sufficiently to offset the tendency toward diminishing re-
turns to capital; at the same time, their relatively labor-saving char-
acter must not be so great as to turn the long-run labor scarcity into
chronic superabundance of labor. In the long run, the character of
improvements must tend to adjust to relative factor scarcities, This
is the main problem which we detect on the first level of structural
analysis.
6531IOSTOW
On the second or short-run level of structural analysis, we take
account of the existence of specialized resources. Here another
growth requirement meets the eye. Changes in the demand struc-
ture must be gradual enough not to overtax the mobility of re-
sources; or, alternatively expressed, the mobility of resources must
be sufficient to permit the specialized resource structure to adjust
to the changing structure of demand. In a continuously growing
economy this condition would have to be continuously satisfied. In
an economy which shows merely long-run growth trends, each suc-
cessive violation of the condition must be eliminated within a reason-
able period of time. No individual violation must permanently
arrest the growth process. This is the problem to which our atten-
tion is called on the second level of disaggregation.
It seems to me that the contributions of both Rostow and Lowe
have the merit of warning us against forgetting about one level of
structural analysis while we are moving on the other level. While it
is methodologically convenient to distinguish the long run from
the short run, we must recognize that the two interact, and that
therefore resource specialization—commonly conceived of as a short-
run phenomenon—requires attention even in the interpretation of
long-run tendencies. In other words, both papers prove that interac-
tions make it necessary to keep one eye on one level while we
engage in detailed analysis on the other level. Let us see how Rostow
and Lowe accomplish this.
Rostow shows very clearly the significance of two circumstances
of which it is easy to lose sight when an oversimplified account is
given of innovational requirements.
One of these circumstances has to do with the phenomena of
total effective demand, external economies, and technical comple-
mentarisms. Improvements in one industry or in one sector usually
give rise to growth in other sectors—in supplementary sectors, to
use Rostow's terminology—quite aside from the likelihood of further
innovations in these supplementary sectors. Even along given pro-
duction functions, it becomes more profitable to produce iron and
steel if a railroad network has been constructed, and to build rail-
roads if there exists a ferrous metal industry of appreciable capacity.
For somewhat different reasons, it is more profitable to build subur-
ban houses if there exists an automobile industry, and more profita-
ble to manufacture automobiles if much of the population is subur-
ban. Rostow's analysis confirms the impression that these demand
interactions, external economies, and technical complementarisms
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must have been quite significant. In the early German protectionist
literature, tariff arguments were based on considerations of this
sort. Recently, it has become more usual to base an argument for
over-all planning on these same considerations. Such tariff argu-
ments or planning arguments are logically not without justification
—the difficulty here of course is that tariffs, on the one hand, and
over-all planning, on the other, possess disadvantages of adifferent
kind. Rostow's paper is not concerned with the policy aspects of
the problem, nor will I dwell upon them. However, I would like
to draw an inference which relates to the innovational require-
ments of the economic system. On what I called the first, or long-
run, level of structural analysis, I concluded that in each period
new improvements are needed to prevent a pressure of diminishing
returns from developing. The interrelations with which Rostow is
concerned should make us think that the periods in which further
new improvements are needed are considerably longer than the
periods for which conventional marginal efficiency schedules are
drawn. When the investments which equate the marginal efficiency
with the rate of interest have been completed, the growth of total
effective demand, external economies, and technical complemen-
tarisms may very well raise the marginal efficiency schedule for the
next short period, even if there are no further improvements; and it
may take many years before the next innovations of great significance
are needed to offset diminishing returns. Of course, it would be very
unrealistic to think that the growth of supplementary sectors is
unconnected with further innovations. But the point here is that,
as a consequence of demand interactions, external economies, and
technical complementarisms, further innovational activity will not
have to carry the entire burden.
However, Rostow's approach also proves that for another reason
the proper adjustment of innovational activity to relative resource
scarcities may become difficult in some periods. It is not unreasona-
ble to expect a tendency toward more labor-saving innovations when
the increase in the labor supply is especially small in relation to that
of the capital supply, and to expect a tendency toward less labor-
saving innovations when the discrepancy between the two is
smaller. It is not unreasonable to expect an adjustment of the char-
acter of innovations to relative resource scarcities. But Rostow makes
it clear that innovational activity must adjust to something else
too. At different levels of the national income, there occur relative
demand shifts of different kinds, and innovational activity will be
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directed to opening up sectors which at that stage have potential
for relative growth. Consumers become. interested in automobiles
when they are reasonably well-fed and -clothed, and not in the
reverse sequence. The requirement that innovational activity should
adjust to income elasticities of demand may be in conflict with the
requirement that it should adjust to relative resource scarcities. Or
rather, the adjustment to relative resource requirements may have
to occur under considerable strain if other adjustments are also
needed. For example, if labor is a relatively scarce factor and de-
mand shifts call for developing a strongly labor-using sector—a sector
with small capital-intensity—the labor-saving character of innova-
tions will have to become all the more pronounced. Innovations will
have to raise the capital-productivity schedules to a correspondingly
larger extent.
In summary, I would like to suggest that Rostow's approach leads
to certain conclusions with respect to the innovational requirements
of growth, conclusions which prove that we have to keep an eye
on the existing resource specialization even when we engage in
long-run analysis and are primarily concerned with relative scarci-
ties in broad factor categories. Innovations are needed because factor
supplies in the broad, unspecialized sense do not grow at equal rates.
But demand interdependence and external economies in specific
industries and technical complementarism, which connects specific
sectors of the economy, have a marked influence on the timing of
the required innovational activity; and shifts in demand between
different specialized sectors have exerted an important influence
on existing degrees of relative factor scarcity.
It seems to me that Lowe's paper relates mainly to problems
which develop on what I called the second level of structural
analysis or disaggregation, where our attention is directed to the
mobility or immobility of specialized resources. Lowe draws a use-
ful distinction between investment goods industries producing equip-
ment for other investment goods industries, investment goods in-
dustries producing equipment for consumer goods industries, and
consumer goods industries. To any given demand structure there
must correspond a pattern of resource specialization which is com-
patible with the required level of activity in these sectors. Starting
from here, we may further disaggregate to any extent that seems
methodologically desirable, but the general character of the spe-
cialization requirements can be made sufficiently clear in Lowe's
initial three-sector model. It is clear that in a growing economy, or
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for that matter in any economy with changing demand structures,
the pattern of specialization will never be in equilibrium with the
demand structure. There will always be some amount of wrong
specialization. Sufficiently small maladjustments may be overcome
simply by changes in inventories or by some degree of excess capac-
ity or overutilization, while major maladjustments will interrupt
the growth process. Whether these interruptions will be short or
long (or will possibly degenerate into a permanent stoppage)
should be expected to depend on the outcome of a race between
mobility and the rate of recurrence of such maladjustments.
From Lowe's paper we may conclude that the limited mobility
of specialized resources may interfere with innovational activity and
with the growth process in general, even if the innovational process
does meet -the so-called long-run requirements. In this connection
I would like to refer to Lowe's illustration of difficulties which
may arise if ex ante savings and ex ante investment change in the
same proportion, but change substantially. In terms of long-run
analysis, one might expect continued smooth growth. But the struc-
ture of production would have to be rearranged to such a sub-
stantial extent that the pattern of specialization would be out of
gear with the requirements of the situation. The question is not
whether we call disturbances of this sort "short-run." It is whether
in the clock-time long run they prove to be episodic. We are here
faced with a race between mobility and wrong specialization. This
is not the same as the classical race between diminishing returns
and improvement, but the two "races" become interrelated with
each other.
These are effective warnings against overlooking resource spe-
cialization with the excuse that our interest is in the "long run."
Perhaps both authors are somewhat inclined to go too far in re-
jecting the traditional type of long-run theorizing. I am convinced
that there are significant problems that are discernible by analysis
that deals with broad, unspecialized categories of factors of produc-
tion. In my comments I have explained what, in my opinion, these
problems are. I don't know whether either Rostow or Lowe means
to suggest that nothing essential becomes visible in theoretical
frameworks that deal with "capital" and "labor" in general. At any
rate, I would not go along with that proposition. But I fully agree
that a useful theory of economic growth must pay a great deal of
attention to problems which cannot even be posed before we take
account of the specialized character of resources.
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MOSES ABRAMOVITZ, National Bureau of Economic Research and
Stanford University
When I undertook the assignment of commenting on Rostow's
paper, I did not realize that his contribution would consist so largely
of a review and systematization of the other papers presented at
this conference. A discussion of Rostow's paper would, therefore,
impose on me an uncomfortable degree of detachment from the
original material. Under the circumstances I feel impelled to join
more directly in the discussion of theoretical approaches to the
economics of growth.
(1)Mypoint of departure is the well-known fact that studies of
long-term changes or persistent international differences in the
level of economic activity inevitably bring into prominence a num-
ber of factors which have been understandably neglected in studies
of short-term changes. These are factors which differ markedly from
country to country but change only slowly over time. In studies of
short-term economic movements in single countries, such factors
are well treated as constants. But they are of the greatest importance
for an explanation of continuing differences in levels of activity
and rates of growth.
Among these neglected factors are such human qualities as
enterprise, industry, mobility, adaptability, and thrift; and such
aspects of economic and social organization as the effectiveness of
a country's financial and business organization and the legal and
traditional sanctions protecting property, contract, and person. Econ-
omists have been impressed with the probable importance of varia-
tion in such factors as these for explaining international differences
and secular change in income, and have concentrated attention upon
them, tried to assess their signfficance, and tried to trace their roots.
In doing so, they have explored very bravely, but no doubt very
awkwardly, territory which is quite strange and difficult for them.
Instead of following the familiar paths traced by private pecuniary
interest, they have stumbled among problems in which the in-
fluence of pecuniary interest seems remote: family organization in
relation to enterprise and efficiency; the social prestige attaching
to industry and trade compared with other occupations or no oc-
cupation; nonpecuniary attachments to locality, product, or method
of work; the degree of habituation to abstract financial instruments;
and so on through a great variety of factors which influence the
energy and effectiveness with which people, as individuals or
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groups, pursue their material advantage. In short, in this area econ-
omists pay the other social sciences the solid compliment of trying
to be practitioners of their disciplines. And I suspect that, in addi-
tion to making a sociological or psychological contribution here
and there, we are also going to discover how difficult the problems
of the other social sciences are compared with those of traditional
economics.
All this effort by economists outside the bounds of ordinary eco-
nomics is right and proper. Like many other students, I have urged
its necessity in connection with studies of economic growth.1 But
the fact that our eyes are now fully opened to the importance of
extra-economic considerations should not cause us to close them
to the contribution which traditional economic considerations can
make. I suspect there is some danger of this. Moreover, there is
evidence that others feel the presence of this danger too. For ex-
ample, Aubrey in his paper writes "A sense of past neglect seems
to ime1 economists to give, at present, more weight to 'noneconomic'
factors. This tendency, however laudable and indeed inevitable,
threatens to lead to disregard of the economist's own field of investi-
gation" (page 897).
However this may be, there is surely a wide range of insights
into long-term changes and international differences in economic
development to be derived from traditional economics. I should
like, therefore, to present—or, better, simply to recall—some ten
theoretical propositions, or hypotheses, derived from orthodox eco-
nomic reasoning, which should help to interpret the secular trends
and international differences observable in capital formation meas-
ures. Just as in the case of the noneconomic factors, their range of
application and their relative importance are still unknown. But
they are plausible; they are subject to verification; and they deserve
close study by economists interested in economic growth.
(2) The first two hypotheses-are quite commonplace derivatives
from the theory of production.
1. Capital formation, as a proportion of net national product,
varies directly with the ratio of the labor force to the capital stock.
2. Capital formation, as a proportion of net national product,
varies directly with the ratio of natural (i.e. "nonhuman" natural)
resources to the stock of capital.
1Forexample, in "Economics of Growth," in A Survey of Contempothry Eco-
nomics,Bernard F. Haley, editor, Irwin, 192, Vol. ii,pp.132-178.
659ROSTOW
The' reasoning behind these two piopositioñs is that, as among
countries (or times) otherwise similar, the marginal productivity
of capital' will tend to be relatively -highwhere (or when)' 'the
quantity. of other resources is large relative to the stock of capital.
Where the marginal productivity df capital is• relatively high, it
may be assumed that the backlog of unexploited opportunities 'to
use additional capital profitably is relatively large. And the rate at
which unexploited opportunities are seized—that is, the level' of
capital formation—is presumably' related to, the size of the existing
backlog of such opportunities. ' ' ' . ' ' -
Somequalifications on the significance of these hypotheses must
be made immediately. They assume diminishing returns to. the
factors of production, a tendency which may be defeated for many
years by the economies of scale in the early development of "empty"
countries. As. between advanced and backward countries,itis
doubtful whether the difference in the opportunities for gain, which
these propositions express, will emerge from the welter of opposing
forces. On the other hand, the propositions are consistent with the
available evidence indicating that 'capital formation ratios in ad-
vanced countries fall in the course of economic development, at
least after the early decades, of industrialization.
3. Capital formation, as a proportion of netnationalproduct,
varies positively with the rate of population growth. .Thispropo-
sition is evidently related to the first, but whereas the first expressed
the effect of the cumulative backlog of investment opportunities,
this expresses the effect of current additions to,the backlog created
by population increase It may be presumed that current additions
are of little 'significance if the cumulative backlog of unexploited
opportimities is' very large. On this reasoning, the proposition may
be expected to 'be of importance only in' relatively well-developed
cOuntries. , ' ' ' ' '
Thereis already 'a' certain 'amount of empirical 'support,for 'the
hypothesis, but' it 'heeds further refinement. In particular, the
effects which operate through the size of the pópulatin at large
should be distingui'shed frOm' those 'which operate through the num-
ber of' families, -and'from thOse 'hich operate through the size of
the 'labor force. 'It' would be interetting, 'too, to discover' 'whether
'population" growth "stimuiates 'investment" enough to' cause capital
stock to grow as fast as the number of people, and whether the in-
vstmejit,,.,so. ,,stimulated. is" disprpportionately concentrated, upon
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4. Capital formation, as a proportion of net national product,
varies positively with the relative size of a country's capital goods
industry. Keynes' treatment of the marginal efficiency of capital
expresses the rationale of this hypothesis. The reasoning is that
the rate of profit depends not only on the expected absolute yield
from given additions to our physical equipment but also on their
cost. The cost of capital goods varies positively with the level of
investment because the capital goods industry, including the labor
attached tO it, cannot quickly be expanded. Thus the size attained
by the capital goods industry at any time acts to limit the level
of investment for considerable periods.
The significance of the hypothesis is somewhat limited by the
fact that, to some extent, capital goods are produced by the same
industries that produce consumer goods. To some extent, then, the
distinction between capital formation and consumption is merely
a matter of intent. Automobiles are an example.
More important is the fact that in some situations productive
capital requires no special industrial outfit or organization for its
production. The leading illustration is perhaps the capital embodied
in cleared farm land wrested from a wilderness. The facts that
this was the prime form of capital required by this and other new
countries in their early development, and that for this purpose each
pioneer farmer constituted his own capital goods industry, pre-
sumably help explain the rapid growth of some originally empty
countries.
In all strictness, the argument applies only to a closed economy.
For individual countries, capital equipment can be purchased as
well as produced. Foreign purchases are, however, limited by a
country's borrowing capacity, by the capacity of its export indus-
tries, by the elasticity of foreign demand for its products, and by the
home demand for imported consumer goods. If, therefore, home-
produced investment is limited by supply conditions in the domestic
capital goods industries, imports of capital goods are limited by
conditions controlling the balance and composition of international
trade.
5. A rising supply of money tends to raise the level of capital
formation, and a failing supply tends to reduce it. The problem
envisaged here arises when there is a secularly rising demand for
goods which is made possible, not by prior increases in production
in the manner contemplated by Say's law, but rather by increases
:in money demand. If such a rise in the demand for goods persists
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over many years, we may neglect the possibility of excess capacity
and infer that prices will be rising. In this process a number of
factors operate to encourage capital formation either singly or in
combination. The new money may appear as an addition to liquid
assets in the hands of individuals or firms. In that event, spending
will be stimulated, and part of it is likely to be for capital goods.
Alternatively, the additional money demand may arise in govern-
ment spending based on new money or in foreign demand. In either
case, there will be a strain on existing productive capacity, and the
resulting profits will stimulate investment. Finally, the new money
may appear as a result of the purchase of securities and loans with
newly created bank money, and the consequent ease of financing
will cause investment to rise. In all these cases, a general rise of
prices eventuates which raises the general level of profits since, for
well-known reasons, the prices at which goods are sold are likely
to rise more rapidly than the prices which represent costs, at least
so long as the pace of inflation is accelerating. The generally high
level of profits stimulates investment partly because of the glow it
casts on the future, partly because it encourages new investors to
seek a share in existing markets, and partly because realized profits
constitute an easy source of self-financing and an encouragement
to lenders. It is this impact of general commodity inflation on invest-
ment which Keynes stressed in the historical analyses in the second
volume of the Treatise on Money.
The range of application of this hypothesis is, of course, in doubt.
Hayek and indeed most of the neoclassical writers seem to deny its
validity altogether. They stress the fact that increasing injections of
money are required to maintain investment booms based on forced
saving. This, they maintain, produces recurrent collapses in which
capital formationisdiscouraged. And since many investments
stimulated by rising prices prove unprofitable when prices finally
cease rising, let alone when they begin dropping, at least a portion
of the capital produced during the boom goes to waste. It has
also been urged, particularly in connection with backward econ-
omies, that chronic inflation diverts entrepreneurial energies from
real capital formation to speculative trading in land, securities, and
commodities, to the prejudice of productive investment. Since a
priori speculation and common knowledge are incapable of settling
the relation between the trends of money supply, prices, and
the level of investment, the question deserves close study.
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6. Private investment, as a proportion of national product, varies
directly with public investment. The argument which leads to this
hypothesis is that there exists in evesy country a considerable range
of valuable uses for capital which private business finds it difficult or
impossible to exploit, because either the projects are too risky or
the returns too long deferred or the venture too large or the
benefits too diffuse to form the basis for private sale and profit.
Examples of such social capital are familiar, and it is obvious that,
once installed, they give rise to numerous opportunities for profita-
ble private investment.
Attempts to verify and measure the strength of the relation be-
tween public and private investment will presumably have to allow
for a lag of uncertain and variable length. They will also have to
take into account the fact that public investment need not be direct;
it can be indirect as in the cases of subsidy, loan, or guarantee of
credit. Moreover, they will have to recognize that public invest-
ment in spheres in which profitable private operation is possible
competes with private investment and so may have a negative net
effect.
7. The international distribution of economic activity, and there-
fore of investment, shifts over time as a result of the impact of de-
veloping technology upon the distribution of locational advantages.
The relation between technological advance and economic growth is,
on the noneconomic side, still a mysterious process, involving the
psychology and sociology of scientific progress, a theory of the
translation of new knowledge into economically productive tech-
nology, and an understanding of the diffusion of the novel product
or process within and between countries. Usher and Maclaurin
have contributed to this aspect of the problem in their papers sub-
mitted to this conference—to say nothing of earlier work by them
and others.
On the economic side, corresponding to any given "state of the
arts," to use the old-fashioned phrase, there is, certeris paribus, a
certain distribution of production throughout the world which
maximizes total output or minimizes the total cost of a given output.
This ideal international distribution of production is determined
by the distribution of geographically fixed resources (including
existing capital equipment and population insofar as they are im-
mobile) taken in conjunction with the techniques available for
exploiting resources and for transporting the resulting products to
places of further manufacture and eventual consumption. The
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static theory of location asserts, either explicitly or implicitly, that
there is a tendency for the actual distribution of economic activity
to approximate the ideal geographical pattern.
As technology progresses, however, shifts occur in the advantages
that beauties possess for production. The resources of some regions,
which were of little importance before, become very valuable, while
regions previously highly favored may lose some of their advantages.
In the process of adapting economic activity to the changing pull
of locational advantage, investment is stimulated in the former
regions and discouraged in the latter.
Some of the very broad results of these shifts during recent cen-
turies are clear: for example, the opening of continental interiors,
the shift of activity from centers of surplus food supply to places
rich in sources of power and industrial raw materials, and the
trend toward spatial concentration of productive activity. But
neither the empirical study of the impact of changing technology
on the geography of production nor the adaptation of static loca-
tion theory to the problem of differential rates of growth is yet far
advanced. Both, it seems to me, deserve heavy stress in the near
future.
I now add two hypotheses concerned with savings as a determinant
of capital formation.
8. Capital formation per capita tends to rise with income per
capita.
9. Capital formation per capita tends to decline as the distribu-
tion of income approaches equality.
The basis for the eighth proposition is Marshall's dictum that
savings per capita vary directly with the "excess of income over
necessary expenses."2 The ninth requires additional support from
the plausible but far from obvious notion that, as between income
classes, absolute differences in saving increase more rapidly than
absolute differences in income.
The eighth proposition implies no commitment to the questionable
view that the ratio of savings to national income tends to increase
as per capita income rises. However, both the eighth and ninth
propositions assume that capital formation varies directly with
the propensity to save. It will be recognized that this assumption
may not be justified if investment demand at various levels of
income is insufficient to absorb the available savings. Such in-
2Principlesof Economics, 8th ed., London, Macrnfflan, 1920, p. 229.
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vestment insufficiency may be due to causes independent of saving,
but it may also be due to saving itself when the profit from increas-
ing output through investment depends on how much of an incre-
ment of real income tends to be spent.
A final proposition completes this decalOgue of orthodox hy-
potheses:
10. Capital formation, as a proportion of national product, tends
to increase as the proportion of income going to profits rises. In
classical economics this proposition was implicit in the view that
profits were the almost exclusive source of savings and that saving
might be treated as identical with capital formation. In more modern
writing the theory is supported by a variety of arguments. Unless
the profit ratio is high because competition is restricted, the in-
centive to invest is stronger the larger the volume of profits. Next,
the level of business saving presumably varies with the volume of
profits. And business saving, since it constitutes self-financing, by-
passes all the obstacles involved in bringing together the supply
of saving and the demand for additional money capital.
(3) The purpose of these comments is merely to recall the in-
sights which orthodox economic theory affords into the problems
of economic growth. Since I do not wish to exaggerate the probable
usefulness of such hypotheses as guides to an understanding of
experience, a few additional remarks seem essential.
I have presented these ten propositions as derived from orthodox
economic thought for two reasons. In the first place, the validity of
each depends upon the effective operation of the profit motive. This
implies that the propositions are likely to prove of greatest use in
interpreting the course of events in those areas of the world and
in those periods in which money income is highly valued and in
which commerce is firmly established as an approved way of life.
Orthodox economic theory, by itsnature, islikely to be most
useful in connection with developed countries or with the foreign
activities of their nationals. But even in primitive economies the
drive for gain is not wholly absent, and until a more systematic ef-
fort is made no one can tell how far orthodox reasoning can take us.
Second, the propositions attribute differences in the profita-
bility of investment to the range of variables to which the older
economists paid most attention—that is, the quantity of human
and nonhuman resources, tastes, technology, and monetary condi-
tions and policy. The profits to be earned by investment are, how-
ever, also influenced by a wide variety of factors connected with
GG1IOSTOW
economic and financial organization and with governmental poiicy.
These presumably will have to be invoked to explain differences in
capital formation not only between advanced and backward econ-
omies, but also among the countries in each group and in each coun-
try over time.
The study of the implications of economic organization, of law,
and of governmental policy is a familiar branch of economics, though
not perhaps of the orthodox variety. We may take Aubrey's paper
to be a good example of this type of work. The study of variations
in economic growth due to differences in the strength of pecuniary
drives and to the degree of rationality with which income is pursued,
and the investigation of the origins of economic institutions—here
are the true happy hunting grounds of economic sociology, as Levy's
paper suggests.
Cranted the importance of orthodox theory, therefore, we can also
easily see that it will have its limits. But even within the area in
which such theory will best apply, the process of exploiting its
insights will not be easy. This is likely to prove true in part because
of the considerable number of variables which even orthodox
reasoning suggests are important, in part because of the scarcity
of reliable data, and in part because of the statistical problems of
identifying the significant variables in the face of rampant covaria-
tion. Finally, part of the difficulty arises because the model of
the secular trend of capital formation which the various orthodox
hypotheses combine to form is unlikely to be one in which each
factor exercises an independent influence in accordance with a
simple mechanical analogy. Interrelations can already be discerned
on the basis of our present scant knowledge The contribution of
savings to capital formation may be either positive or negative ac-
cording to the strength of the inducement to invest and the, be-
havioral characteristics of the money markets. The rate of popula-
tion growth affects the inducement to invest through its influence
upon the size of the labor force; but it also affects the supply of
savings through its influence upon the ratio of workers to de-
pendents and through the fact that the various income classes
reproduce at different rates.3 The rate of population growth itself
is presumably a function of the growth of income and, therefore,
of capital formation. All this suggests that the application of ortho-
dox reasoning to growth problems will involve not merely strenuous
empirical investigation, but the solution of a variety of sticky theo-
See Kuznets' paper, esp. Appendix C.
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retical riddles. It also suggests that the attempt, exemplified in this
paper, to recognize a dichotomy between economic and extra-
economic considerations can at best represent oniy a stage of work.
The two sets of causes are too closely interwoven for either to be
kept impounded during the stretches of time relevant to the prob-
lems of economic growth.
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